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NOT  PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No:  06-2511
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
   v.
GILBERT WILSON,
               Appellant
                                   
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey
District Court No. 05-CR-643
District Court Judge: The Honorable Jerome B. Simandle
                                   
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
April 12, 2007
Before: SMITH and COWEN, Circuit Judges, 
and YOHN, District Judge*
(Filed April 16, 2007)
                                   
OPINION
                                   
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Gilbert Wilson pleaded guilty to a one count indictment, which charged him with
2being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).  The pre-
sentence report enhanced Wilson’s offense level by two points under United States
Sentencing Guideline (U.S.S.G.) § 2K2.1(b)(4) because the firearm had been reported as
stolen.  The total offense level of 23 and the criminal history category of V yielded a
guideline range of 84 to 105 months.  
At sentencing, Wilson argued that the enhancement for a stolen firearm should not
be applied.  The District Court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to prove
that the firearm was stolen and declined to apply the enhancement.  The District Court
was not persuaded, however, by Wilson’s argument that his criminal history category of
V overstated the seriousness of his past criminal conduct, thereby warranting a downward
departure.  See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b).  The Court explained:  
[T]here is a continuous thread from 1988 through 1990 and continuing
throughout the ‘90s all the way through the year 2005 of the defendant
continuing to violate the law, to be disrespectful of the law, his possession
and use of narcotic drugs without looking for any treatment and his
uncontrolled, or poorly controlled . . . anger management.  That’s what
makes this crime of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon a
significant and substantial charge . . . . I find that Category V is as accurate
a description as any of the prior history that brings us here today.
Based on these factors, the Court determined that Wilson’s guideline range, calculated on
an adjusted offense level of 21 and a criminal history category of V, was 70 to 87 months. 
In an effort to obtain a sentence below the guideline range, Wilson asserted that his
guideline range was too severe as it would impose a sentence that was greater than
necessary to achieve the purposes set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).  The District Court
1See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
2The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  See United States v. Cooper, 437
F.3d 324, 327-28 (3d Cir. 2006).
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disagreed.  The Court acknowledged that post-Booker1 the guideline range was only one
factor to consider under § 3553(a).  After noting the other factors warranting
consideration and the circumstances of Wilson’s offense, the Court commented that it
“would like to think that by age 35 that Mr. Wilson has learned the lessons of all his prior
criminal involvement within the system, but I just don’t see it.”  The Court rhetorically
asked what sentence was “sufficient but no greater than necessary to achieve the purposes
that are spelled out in Section 3553(a),” and declared that “[u]nder all of these
circumstances, I’ve determine[d] that a sentence of 70 months is the appropriate sentence
and that it’s sufficient but no greater than necessary to achieve these goals.”   By way of
explanation, the Court cited the need to protect the community, the “wisdom” of the
guidelines, and the need to deter Wilson from engaging in further criminal activity.
Wilson appealed.2   He does not challenge the computation of his sentencing
guideline.  Rather, he contends that the District Court unreasonably applied the § 3553(a)
sentencing factors.  According to Wilson, the District Court erred by mechanically relying
on the wisdom of the guidelines and by failing to appreciate his argument that the
circumstances of his offense, his personal history, and his characteristics were unlike
most felons-in-possession.  As a result, Wilson asserts that the Court failed to recognize
4that his advisory guideline range of 70 to 87 months was excessive and that a sentence at
the lower end of the guideline range was greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of
sentencing.
“To determine if the court acted reasonably in imposing the resulting sentence, we
must first be satisfied the court exercised its discretion by considering the relevant factors.
. . . The record must demonstrate the trial court gave meaningful consideration to the §
3553(a) factors.”  United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006).  After
reviewing the record before us, we are satisfied that the District Court complied with
Cooper’s directives.  The transcript of the sentencing hearing confirms that the District
Court not only addressed all of Wilson’s legal and factual arguments, but that it also
considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors.  The Court’s thoughtful consideration of these
factors is reflected in its explanation for denying the request for a § 4A1.3(b) downward
departure on the basis that Wilson’s criminal history category overstated the seriousness
of his past criminal history.  
We are mindful of Wilson’s contention that the District Court failed to  appreciate
his argument that the policy judgments of § 2K2.1 were inapposite in this case and
yielded an excessively high guideline range.  We find, however, that the Court fully
considered this argument, and that it was well aware that it could impose a sentence that
varied from the advisory guideline range based on Wilson’s individual characteristics. 
That the District Court ultimately rejected such an option given Wilson’s persistent
problems with anger management, his ongoing involvement with marijuana, and his
5continuing violations of law, does not render the sentence imposed unreasonable.
Accordingly, we conclude that Wilson has failed to meet his burden of proving the
unreasonableness of his sentence.  We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
